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Abstract
Academic spin-offs are one way in which employability of university grad-
uates is reflected. Using the ZEW spinoff-survey, this paper studies em-
pirically the impact of human capital on the success of academic spin-
offs founding in knowledge and technology intensive sectors. The focus is
thereby on the composition of human capital which is described according
to whether or not the founders have studied several subjects and whether
or not they all come from the same research establishment. Additionally
the impact of having founded as a team is analyzed. Success is measured
by employment growth. The findings suggest that it is advantageous to
found within a team, but that the human capital composition both for
single entrepreneurs and team foundations is rather irrelevant.
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Non-technical summary
Universities are increasingly required to train their students in order to qualify
them for a job, i.e. to make them employable. One way in which employability
is reflected is through the capability of graduates to found an own firm. In this
paper I focus on the question, which kind of human capital students should get
during their university education for successfully founding a new firm. Should po-
tential entrepreneurs rather be educated interdisciplinary and found a firm alone
or should they specialize in one discipline and found together with other spe-
cialists? Should one bring together people from theory-oriented institutions (like
universities) and practically-oriented institutions (like technical colleges)? Based
on the model by Lazear (2005), who puts forward that entrepreneurs should be
interdisciplinary-oriented jacks-of-all-trades, and on the model by Fabel (2004),
who suggests that successful firm foundations occur within teams composed of
specialists, four hypotheses are developed and tested empirically for academic
spin-offs: 1) Teams are more successful than single entrepreneurs, 2) Single en-
trepreneurs who are generalists are more successful than single entrepreneurs who
are specialists, 3) Teams whose members have studied different subjects are more
successful than teams whose members have all studied the same subject, and 4)
Teams whose members have the same institutional background are more success-
ful than heterogeneous teams. Success is thereby measured in terms of average
employment growth since the date of foundation.
The empirical analysis is carried out using the ZEW spinoff-survey, a data set on
almost 3,000 academic spin-offs founded in knowledge and technology intensive
sectors in Germany between 1996 and 2001. The results indicate that teams
indeed are more successful than single entrepreneurs, but that the human capital
composition both for teams and for single entrepreneurs is rather irrelevant for
the success. Only teams operating in technology-oriented services with engineers
and business administrators among their founders are more successful than teams
which do not exhibit such a combination in this sector.
1 Introduction
One of the recent claims demanded on universities is to train their students in
order to qualify them for a job. “Employability” is the keyword often used in
this context. For Europe, this demand is manifested for example in the Bologna
Declaration of the European Ministers of Education in 1999. Employability of
university graduates is reflected in two ways: First, in the capability of graduates
to find a job as an employee and second, in their ability to set up an own firm.
The focus of this paper is on spin-offs of entrepreneurial firms out of academia.
These start-ups are seen as substantial for the development of knowledge-based
economies because they transfer recently explored technologies and knowledge
into marketable products. Furthermore, they provide an alternative to wage em-
ployment for graduates. The “German Rectors’ Conference” actually calls upon
universities to sensitize their students for entrepreneurship because it conjectures
that traditional dependent employment will recede in a knowledge-based economy
(HRK 1998).
It has been widely recognized that human capital is essential to build up a firm
and keep it running.1 Moreover, some authors have pointed out that human
capital can even explain the financial structure of new firms and its role on
new firms’ success.2 In the literature, human capital is measured by means of
variables that capture mostly the level of human capital. The most common
include the years of education attained by the founder(s) of the firm, the age of
the proprietors, the years of previous experience and previous employment status.
In contrast, this paper considers the composition of human capital employed in
the foundation of new firms and its potential role in the firms’ performance. In
particular I ask: What kind of human capital is relevant for the success of new
firms built up by university graduates? Is it rather that interdisciplinary educated
individuals are more successful or is it more favorable to have teams consisting
of disciplinary educated specialists? The answer to these questions could give an
advice for the current restructuring of the curricula of higher education.
1See Bates (1990), Bruderl, Preisendorfer and Ziegler (1992), Almus and Nerlinger (1999),
Taylor (1999), Moog, Backes-Gellner (2003), Fabel (2004), Lazear (2005).
2Cressy (1996) argues that for the particular case of the UK “the influence of finance on
performance is nil and the correlation between finance and survival vanishes once human capital
is controlled for”.
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There are two theoretical approaches that link the composition of human capital
to firm foundations. The first is the jack-of-all-trades view (Lazear, 2005) which
states that individuals with a broad range of skills are more likely to become
entrepreneurs. And the second is the team production approach by Fabel (2004)
which suggests that individuals should specialize in one task in order to avoid
mistakes while setting up a firm. Different specialized individuals should then
form a team in order to conduct the different tasks related to a firm foundation.
These two papers form the starting point of my analysis. While both approaches
consider the role of the human capital composition mainly for the probability of
founding a firm I am interested in the impact of the human capital composition
on the subsequent success of new firms started by academic graduates. The ideas
of Lazear and Fabel are therefore extended to generate hypotheses about the
relation of human capital structure to success.
By using the ZEW spinoff-survey which contains information on firm foundations
by university graduates in Germany and their study profiles, I pursue two main
objectives in this paper. First, I want to evaluate the empirical relevance of the
mentioned theoretical approaches by Lazear and Fabel. As will become clear
below, these two approaches are not really contradictory but rely on different
sets of assumptions thereby highlighting different aspects of the relation between
the composition of human capital and firm foundation. The most outstanding is
that Lazear assumes that only one person is responsible for the foundation while
Fabel suggests that there should be a team to undertake the firm foundation.
This paper tests the relevance of both ideas by comparing academic spin-offs
by teams and foundations by single entrepreneurs with respect to their success.
Second, I attempt to evaluate the impact of the particular composition of human
capital on the success of academic spin-offs. The composition of human capital
is thereby characterized according to two dimensions: a) subjects studied by the
founders, and b) the type of research establishment the founders come from (i.e.
whether they come from a university or a technical college or elsewhere).
The results show that it is beneficial to found within a team but that the compo-
sition of the team is rather irrelevant. Also for the single entrepreneurs it seems
to be negligible whether or not they have a broad range of skills.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the theoretical approaches
by Lazear and Fabel and develops the hypotheses for the empirical analysis.
2
Section 3 describes the data set at hand and tests the hypotheses presented in
the previous section. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2 Theoretical Background
2.1 The “Jack-of-all-Trades”-Model by Lazear
In Lazear’s model individuals are endowed with a range of skills, but have dif-
ferent skill profiles. There are individuals that can perform several things on a
similar quality level and individuals that have one outstanding skill compared
to their other skills. Individuals have two different possibilities to generate in-
come: They can work for another person as an employee or they can become
entrepreneurs. When working as an employee individuals exploit their best skill
for income generation, that is, they specialize in one of their skills. When de-
ciding to become an entrepreneur they have to use the full range of their skills.
However, income generation as an entrepreneur is restricted by the skill with
which the individuals are least endowed. According to Lazear entrepreneurs are
persons whose primary job is to bring together different factors of production for
creating a new product or producing an old product at lower costs. Primarily,
they have “to combine talents and manage those of others”. For this they must
have knowledge in different areas, that is: they have to be jack-of-all-trades, and
cannot specialize in a certain subject. Lazear then shows that having an evenly
distributed skill profile increases the probability of becoming an entrepreneur.
Additionally, Lazear proves that individuals who plan to become specialists only
invest in one of their skills. This is because it would be a wasting of resources to
invest in a skill that is not used later on. In contrast, future entrepreneurs invest
in the skill with which they are least endowed or they invest in more than one
skill. This depends on the relationship between marginal costs of investment in
education as a function of the innate skills and marginal returns to entrepreneur-
ship. However, Lazear argues that on average one should observe that future
entrepreneurs have a more balanced investment strategy than future employees
because they are the only individuals who invest in more than one skill.
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Lazear also provides an empirical test for his approach. Using a data set com-
prising alumni from the Stanford Graduate School of Business he finds a positive
relationship between the number of different roles, described by occupational ti-
tles an individual has held, and the probability that this individual founds his
own firm. Also, individuals who become entrepreneurs have taken a broader
range of courses while studying at Stanford. Wagner (2003) tests Lazear’s view
with a more representative sample than graduates from one special university.
He uses a 0.1% sample of the working population in Germany and also finds
evidence supporting Lazear’s approach. The result of his analysis is that the
probability of becoming self-employed rises both with the number of different
kinds of professional training (e.g. apprenticeships, degrees as master craftsmen
or university degrees) an individual completes after school and the number of
changes of profession. The effects are partly quite big. For example, the proba-
bility of becoming self-employed rises by more than three percentage points if an
individual has one instead of zero different kinds of professional training.
2.2 The partnership model of entrepreneurship by Fabel
One special feature of the model by Lazear, described above, is that he focuses
on single entrepreneurs. The firms of these single entrepreneurs produce output
with three factors of production: managerial talent, which is the minimum of
the skills of the entrepreneur, and two skills which are provided by dependently
employed specialists. Lazear implicitly assumes that it is not possible to compen-
sate the weaknesses of the entrepreneur by employing specialists who can take
over the task the entrepreneur is weak in. For example: One could imagine an
entrepreneur with relatively weak quantitative skills but relatively strong commu-
nicative skills. This entrepreneur could employ a worker with strong quantitative
skills to compensate his weakness in the quantitative area. But this is not allowed
for in the model.
Alternatively, Fabel (2004) presents a partnership view of entrepreneurship. He
reasons that the project “firm foundation” shall be carried out by a team of
specialists. In his model he adapts the O-ring production function approach de-
veloped by Kremer (1993). According to this theory, each task of the production
process is important for the value of the final product in such a way that the
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market value of the product is reduced considerably when the tasks at any stage
are not performed sufficiently well.3 For setting up a firm this means that if
any member of the founding team makes a considerable mistake while perform-
ing his task, the foundation will fail. The probability to make a failure of each
team member is a function of his ability. The project success therefore depends
crucially on the ability of the team members.
In this setting Fabel shows that optimization behavior results in teams that are
homogeneous with respect to their ability. This is because within the O-ring
production approach the marginal productivity of the skill of one team member
depends positively on the abilities of the other team members. That is, the
abilities of the team members are complementary and one team member performs
better the more able the other team members are. This implies that a team
consisting of high ability individuals places the highest value on having an equally
able team member for a further task and will therefore offer the highest wage.
Equivalent arguments hold for teams with initially medium ability level or low
ability level team members.
Although the possibility that a firm is founded by only one person is not com-
pletely ruled out, Fabel shows that only individuals above a certain threshold
ability take on a firm foundation. The reason is that the project risk decreases
with ability, which is also due to the underlying production function. Together
with the result that group size increases in members’ ability, on average we should
observe that firms are founded by teams.
2.3 Hypotheses for the success of spin-offs
The above presented theoretical ideas mainly make statements about the proba-
bility to take the chance of a firm foundation. In Lazear’s model the probability
to become an entrepreneur is enhanced if the respective individual has a bal-
anced skill profile. By contrast, in Fabel’s model high ability individuals have
3This type of production function is called O-Ring production function backing to the ac-
cident of the space shuttle Challenger. The Challenger exploded because tiny components
of its construction malfunctioned: the O-rings. So, the message deduced from this event is:
Everything has to function sufficiently well to lead a project to success.
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the highest probability to take up a foundation. However, the aim of the pa-
per at hand is to evaluate empirically the impact of the composition of human
capital on the subsequent success of entrepreneurial firms founded by academic
graduates. Additionally, the relevance of the two theoretical ideas for the success
of academic spin-offs is evaluated. Fabel’s model indeed makes some prediction
about the success of a new firm where success is measured by the survival of the
firm.4 However, in the empirical part of this paper survival cannot be applied as
performance measure since there are only surviving firms in the data set. Instead,
average employment growth since the year of foundation is used. The approaches
by Lazear and Fabel therefore have to be extended to derive hypotheses about
the human capital composition and employment growth.
As already mentioned, the most striking difference between the two models is that
Lazear implicitly assumes that there are only single entrepreneurs whereas Fabel
conjectures that firms are founded primarily by teams. This point allows the test
of the empirical relevance of the two approaches. But what are the implications
of the models for employment growth? A result of the analysis of Fabel is that
firm size rises with quality and that there is a unique optimal team size. Team
foundations are greater than foundations by single entrepreneurs in equilibrium.
Assuming that all firms start with a small firm size team foundations should have
a greater potential for growth than single entrepreneurs. The related hypothesis
is:
Hypothesis 1: Team foundations are more successful than founda-
tions by single entrepreneurs.
One might conjecture that it is already a well known fact that team foundations
are more successful than single entrepreneurs. However, surveying the literature
it turns out that existing studies are mostly descriptive, rely partly on small
numbers of observations (Mellewigt and Spaeth, 2005) and the results are not as
clear as expected. For example, Cooper and Bruno (1977) report that in their
sample of 250 high technology firms founded in the area of San Francisco in the
1960s 83 percent of the high growth firms (firms with annual sales of more than $5
4For example, the model predicts that teams with a low average ability are more likely to
fail and shut down.
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million) were set up by teams. But also more than half of the unsuccessful firms
(firms with less than annual sales of $5 million or firms which ceases to exist)
were founded by teams. Stam and Schutjens (2006) find for the Netherlands that
among a group of start-up firms which were registered in the Dutch Chamber of
Commerce the share of team start-ups that shut down during the first six years
is lower than the share of single entrepreneur firms. Moreover, 4.5 percent of the
team foundations have more than 10 employees and 3.3 percent have more than
20 employees after six years, compared to 0.4 percent and 1.3 percent among the
firms started by a single person.
Among the studies that aim at figuring out the causal effect of having founded
as a team on the subsequent success the results are also mixed. Cooper et al.
(1994) conduct multinomial logit-analysis with the categories “failure”, “survival
without or low employment growth” and “high employment growth”. They find
that having one more full-time partner increases the probability of being among
the firms with an employment growth of at least two persons (high employment
growth) instead of being among the failing firms by 25 percent. But, having
founded as a team has no effect on the probability of survival without or low
employment growth compared to the probability of failing. Bruederl et al. (1996)
apply bivariate Probit analyses and find that having a partner has no effect on
survival, employment growth and sales growth among firms founded in the area
of Upper Bavaria once seed capital and number of employees at foundation time
is controlled for. Almus and Nerlinger (1999) ran a bivariate Tobit of average
employment growth of young innovative firms in West-Germany on a dummy
that indicates whether or not the firm was founded by a team (and additional
explanatory variables). Their result is that having founded as a team has no
significant effect on average employment growth for innovative firms. However,
non-innovative firms, which are included in the analysis for comparison reasons,
experience a higher employment growth if they are founded by a team. Schutjens
and Wever (2000) find for Dutch entrepreneurs who registered their new firm in
the Chamber of Commerce in the first quarter of 1994 that team foundations are
1.7 times as likely to hire employees within three years than single entrepreneurs.
And also, Egeln et al. (2003) arrive at the conclusion that teams have a positive
impact on employment growth. Their objects of investigation are new firms in
research- and knowledge-intensive sectors.
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Thus, the results of the impact of having founded as a team in the existing litera-
ture are not as clear-cut as one might assume. Additionally, to my knowledge no
research has been conducted that is especially focussing on the situation of team
foundations in comparison with foundations by single entrepreneurs of academic
spin-offs.
Regarding Lazear’s model, it is assumed that a single entrepreneur is in charge
of the founding. As mentioned, Lazear claims that only people with a sufficiently
balanced skill profile will become an entrepreneur and employ other individuals as
factors of production. This implies that all individuals with an imbalanced skill
profile who try themselves as entrepreneurs will vanish over time. The reason
is that specialists realize after a while that they can earn more money if they
are employed by others. Clearly, this presupposes some kind of uncertainty at
the outset. If a specialist is fully aware of his type and knows all employment
opportunities at the beginning he will never start up a firm. But if this awareness
is a result of a learning process he may start a firm first and then switch to
dependent employment.5 And, if the learning process has several stages then
the unsuitable entrepreneur will not shut down overnight but may at first reduce
employment in order to reduce costs. Thus, the hypothesis that can be deduced
about employment growth from Lazear’s model is:
Hypothesis 2: Generalistic single entrepreneurs found more suc-
cessful firms in terms of employment growth than specialized single
entrepreneurs.
In Fabel’s model teams have to conduct a certain number of different tasks which
are each carried out by one person. Teams whose members have acquired similar
types of skills (in the following called “specialized teams”) must fall apart on
the way to equilibrium because the team members represent perfect substitutes
for each other. On the other hand, teams whose members obtained different
skills (“generalistic teams”) but did not receive their optimal team size grow
while reaching the equilibrium (assuming that firms tend to be founded smaller
5This goes in the direction of Jovanovic (1982) who models the evolution of the industry
structure as a process of noisy selection. Firms do not know their efficiency at the outset but
get to know it through learning. Efficient firms then grow, and insufficient firms decline.
8
than their optimal size). Thus, a similar hypothesis to the one about single
entrepreneurs can be formulated for teams:
Hypothesis 3: Generalistic teams found more successful firms in
terms of employment growth than specialized teams.
Further, in the model by Fabel there are only teams which are homogeneous
with respect to their ability in equilibrium. Hence, heterogeneous teams must
break up on the way to equilibrium. This will happen because net profits of
heterogeneous teams will be negative. Why? Individuals are paid according
to their ability. Higher quality individuals get higher wages. In mixed teams
the expected revenue will not suffice to pay all individuals the wage according
to their quality, since with given average abilities of the team members (i.e.
given output) the wage costs are higher in mixed than in homogeneous teams.
Thus, individuals running a firm with a heterogeneous team either have to take
on payments below their market wage to secure the existence of the firm or
will leave in order to join another team that can provide a wage appropriate to
their quality. Clearly, rational individuals will choose the latter option. Again,
for the formation of heterogeneous teams there is some incomplete information
in the beginning necessary. In terms of employment growth this would mean
that firms with a heterogeneous team will shrink. Thus, the hypothesis about
employment growth of homogeneous respectively heterogeneous teams from the
model by Fabel is:
Hypothesis 4: Teams which are homogeneous in regard to their abil-
ity are more successful in founding firms than heterogeneous teams.
3 Empirical Implementation
This section ties up to the theoretical considerations and empirically evaluates
the two ideas by Lazear and Fabel with respect to their relevance concerning the
success of academic spin-offs. In the following, the data base is described, then
the estimation strategy is presented, and finally the results are shown.
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3.1 Data
The data set used is the ZEW spin-off survey raised in 2001 (Egeln et al., 2002 and
2003). The population for this survey are all firm foundations in research- and
knowledge-intensive sectors in Germany between 1996 and 2001. These sectors
are divided into three groups:
High-tech Industry : These are branches with a high effort in R&D. For
example: the chemical and pharmaceutical industry, construction, or
the computer industry.
Technology-oriented services : In these sectors the use of new technolo-
gies is particularly relevant. For example: software and computing
consulting, technical offices, or research services.
Knowledge-intensive services : Here, the qualification of the employees
or the use of knowledge is important. For example: consulting, tax
accountancy, or education.
Information about firm foundations in research- and knowledge intensive sec-
tors are made available to the ZEW by CREDITREFORM. CREDITREFORM
is the largest credit rating agency in Germany. It provides a broad amount of
information about almost all German companies covered by the commercial reg-
ister, or for which a request concerning its creditworthiness is posed. For the
spinoff-survey 20,241 interviews were conducted. The survey was undertaken be-
tween October and December 2001 using computer-aided telephone interviews
(CATI). Unlike other investigations about firm foundations, which often focus
on research institutes or start-up centers, the firm founders themselves were in-
terviewed. “Firm foundations” are defined as the take up of an entrepreneurial
activity which was not performed before and which suffices as occupation for at
least one person. Thus, refoundations, investments in other firms, and part time
foundations do not count as firm foundations.
Foundations are identified as academic spin-offs if at least one of the founders
has studied or is currently studying at a university or a technical college, and
additionally, if academic skills, new scientific methods, or new scientific results
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have been essential for the foundation. That is, only a subset of foundations
with graduates among the founders have been regarded as spinoff, namely the
foundations with which a transfer of technology is assumed. Foundations with
graduates for which new scientific methods or new scientific results have not been
essential or have not been important at all are not considered as spin-offs. Since
questions concerning the human capital have only been posed to spin-offs the
analysis has to be confined to these firms. The number of observations used in
the analyses comprises then 2,975 firms.
The most relevant information for this paper comprise the subjects studied by
the founders and the research establishment the founders come from. Further
information contained in the data set cover general facts about the firms, such as
the year of foundation, the size of the foundation team, the number of employ-
ees in the year of foundation, the number of employees in 2001, the connection
between the firms and the scientific world and whether the firm received public
support.
One property of the data set is that it contains only surviving firms which could
give rise to selection issues. This would be the case when the different foundation
types (team foundations, single foundations, foundations with a generalist, foun-
dations with a specialist, foundations with a generalistic team, foundations with
a specialistic team, foundations with a homogeneous team and foundations with
a heterogeneous team) are affected systematically differently by firm closure. For
example, if single foundations are more likely to shut down the effect of having
founded as a team will be overestimated. Given the information in the data set it
cannot be controlled for the potential bias. But from the existing evidence com-
paring the probability of survival between team and single foundations it cannot
be inferred that it is a severe problem in any case. Prantl (2003) shows that
team foundations are less likely to go bankrupt but they are more likely to close
their firms voluntarily, since team members may trigger the liquidation because
of internal conflicts between the team members.
3.2 Estimation Strategy
The indicator of success used in the analyses is employment growth. This measure
is chosen mainly for two reasons. Information on employment is usually not
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confidential and easy to collect so that it can be regarded as reliable. Further,
I argue that it is indeed a good indicator for the performance of young firms
the management of a firm only decides to employ people if the firm faces good
prospects. Schutjens and Wever (2000) conjecture that success in young firms is
almost always accompanied with employment growth.
For the econometric model it is assumed that employment grows exponentially:
E2002,i = [e
F (Xiβ,Ziγ)H(A2002,i, Et,i)
δ]2002−tiEt,ii,
where E denotes employment, A firm age and t the year of foundation. The
parameters β, γ and δ will be estimated. The term in the square brackets is the
growth factor. It depends on variables X which capture the interesting effects of
team foundation, generality and homogeneity. These variables will be described
in more detail below. The vector Z contains relevant control variables including
a constant term. Finally, the function H, relates age and employment in the
foundation year to employment growth. It will take on a second-order logarithmic
expansion in the regressions. The error term  is assumed to be lognormally
distributed.
Taking logs the resulting regression equation is then:
ln(GF ) ≡ ln(E2002,i)− ln(Et,i)
2002− ti = Xiβ + Ziγ + lnH(A2002,i, Et,i)δ + ui,
where ui ∼ N(0, σ2) and independent of the observed explanatory variables
X,Z,A, and E. The dependent variable is the (geometric) average employment
growth of firm i. It is the log of the growth factor, therefore indicated by GF .
This proceeding is equivalent to the framework by Evans (1987) developed to
figure out the relation between firm size, age and growth. Subsequently it has
been repeatedly used in the literature (e.g. Almus and Nerlinger, 1999 or Moog
and Backes-Gellner, 2003).
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The central variables used for the estimation are defined as follows:
Team: This variable is a dummy taking the value one if the size of the
foundation team comprises two ore more persons. It is the relevant
variable for hypothesis 1.
Generalist : This variable captures whether or not a single entrepreneur
is a generalist. It relates to hypothesis 2. It takes the value one if
a single entrepreneur has studied several subjects during academic
education.
This definition of generalization is rather wide. A single entrepreneur
is seen as a generalist if he studied any further subject regardless of
how much related this subject is to his first subject (e.g. a single
entrepreneur is termed a generalist if he studied physics and chem-
istry). But, from a different perspective a single entrepreneur may
only be regarded as a generalist if he studied a subject from another
discipline, e.g. natural sciences and business sciences. Therefore an
additional dummy is constructed taking the value one if the single en-
trepreneur obtained skills from at least two different disciplines and
used alternatively in the regressions.
Generalistic Team: This is the relevant variable for hypothesis 3. It
takes the value one for teams whose members have studied different
subjects and zero otherwise.
As in the case of single entrepreneurs the definition of “generaliza-
tion” is strengthened in a further step by assigning this variable to be
only one if the team is composed of members coming from different
disciplines (e.g., if it is composed of a physicist, an economist and
an engineer, but not if it is composed of a physicist, a chemist and a
biologist).
Teams with the same institutional background (Homogeneous Teams):
The O-ring model predicts that in equilibrium all teams should be
homogeneous in regard to the probability of making a failure in the
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production process. However, the probability of failing in task perfor-
mance cannot be calculated with the data set at hand. Nevertheless,
a measure of the quality of the team members can be constructed. In
the data set there is information about which type of research estab-
lishment (university, technical college, Max-Planck-Society,. . . ) the
founders have attended. Under the assumption that the quality of
education one obtains is sufficiently comparable within one type of
research establishment and sufficiently different across different types
of research establishments, the origination of the founders from a cer-
tain research establishment can be used as a measure of the founders’
quality. Therefore, a dummy variable was generated that takes the
value one if the foundation was a team foundation and all founders
come from the same type of research establishment. This dummy
relates then to hypothesis 4.
All the dummy variables defined above are interacted with industry dummies
to capture industry-specific effects of these variables. For all hypotheses, the
expectation concerning the sign of the coefficients of these interacted variables is
positive.6
The estimations are carried out applying OLS with robust standard errors with
employment growth being the dependent variable. The precise regression equa-
tions for the first hypothesis is:
ln(GF ) = β0 + β1Team in high tech industry
+ β2Team in technology oriented services
+ β3Team in knowledge intensive services
+ δ1ln(Et,i) + δ2ln(A2002,i) + δ3ln(Et,i) ∗ ln(A2002,i) +
+ δ4ln(Et,i)
2 + δ5ln(A2002,i)
2 + (control variables)γ + i
The regression equations for the other hypotheses are built equivalently by re-
placing the variables in the first three rows by the respective dummies for the
6Regression results without industry specific effects are shown in Table 8 in the appendix.
Qualitatively they do not differ from the results in the main text.
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other hypotheses. The control variables include contacts to science (number dif-
ferent types of contacts), continuous R&D (yes/no), occasional R&D (yes/no),
public promotion (yes/no), dummies for two of the three sectors high-tech indus-
try, technology oriented services and knowledge intensive services, and a proxy
for former job experience gathered in the firm. The latter variable is constructed
by calculating the difference between the year of foundation and the year in which
the last founder left academia. It therefore measures the minimum job experience
brought in the firm.
3.3 Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics are given in Table 1. The respective information for the
control variables can be found in the appendix (Table 7).
The majority of the firms in the data set were founded by teams (62 percent)
but a considerable part is also founded by single entrepreneurs (39 percent). On
average, a firm founded by a team grows with a higher rate than a firm founded by
a single entrepreneur: Single foundations exhibit an average annual employment
growth of 13 percent during their lifespan, while team foundations grow with
an average rate of 16 percent. This difference is statistically significant at the
1 percent level. Also, the expansion rate of the highest-growing firm among
the team foundations is much higher than the expansion rate of the highest-
growing firm among the single foundations: While the team foundation with the
strongest employment growth more than quadruplet its employment the highest-
growing single foundation increases its employment only by a factor of 2.6 per
year. However, the distribution of the employment growth between the two
extreme values does not differ between the two firm types.
Most of the single foundations start with at most 3 full-time equivalent jobs, and
also the average number of employees in the foundation year amounts to roughly
3 full-time equivalent jobs.7 Only a minority of 5 percent start with more than
10 employees. The team foundations tend to start with more employees. Their
average number of full-time equivalent jobs amounts to 5.5, and also the values
of the denoted percentiles are greater than those of the single foundations.
7These numbers include the founding persons.
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The age of the foundations is evenly distributed for both foundation types with
an average age of 3.98 years of the single foundations and 3.71 years of the team
foundations. The foundations by single entrepreneurs are therewith somewhat
older.
Almost all of the single entrepreneurs in the sample are specialists, i.e. they
have studied only one subject. Only about 6 percent of the single entrepreneurs
have broadened their skill profile by learning a second subject and are therefore
regarded as generalists. This number declines to 4.5 percent if generalists with
respect to disciplines are considered. That is, if an individual decides to study
a further subject he chooses a subject from another discipline in most of the
cases. Among the team foundations the fraction of generalized teams is lower
than the fraction of specialized teams: About 44 percent of the team foundations
consist of partners with different backgrounds. Looking on disciplines the fraction
of generalistic teams declines to 36 percent. Regarding the homogeneity of the
quality, 71 percent of the team foundations are erected by partners who originate
from the same research establishment.
As can be seen from Table 7 in the appendix, the foundation types hardly differ
concerning their distribution over the sectors. Most of the foundations are es-
tablished in the technology-oriented services (42 percent for both types). In the
second place range the knowledge-intensive services: 42 percent of the firms with
a single entrepreneur and 40 percent of the team foundations are established in
this sector. Only 16 percent of the single foundations and about 18 percent of
the team foundations occur in the high-tech industry.
3.4 Results
In the following the estimation results are presented.
Teams vs. Single Entrepreneurs. At first the hypothesis that team foun-
dations are more successful than single foundations is analyzed (hypothesis 1).
The results of the respective regression are shown in Table 2. The interesting
coefficients in this case are the ones relating to the dummies Team in high-tech
industry, Team in technology-oriented services and Team in knowledge-intensive
services.
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Table 2: Employment Growth and Team Foundation
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth: ln(E2002,i)−ln(Et,i)2002−ti Coeff. (Std. Error)
Team in high-tech industry 0.047 (0.020)**
Team in technology-oriented services 0.046 (0.011)***
Team in knowledge-intensive services 0.047 (0.013)***
ln(Et) -0.092 (0.018)***
ln(A) 0.212 (0.023)***
ln(Et) ∗ ln(A) 0.012 (0.009)
(ln(Et))2 0.009 (0.004)**
(ln(A))2 -0.100 (0.010)***
Job experience -0.002 (0.000)***
Number of contacts to science 0.018 (0.002)***
Continuous R&D 0.051 (0.009)***
Occasional R&D 0.016 (0.010)
Public support 0.028 (0.008)***
Technology-oriented services1 -0.021 (0.018)
Knowledge-intensive services1 -0.002 (0.019)
Constant 0.037 (0.027)
R2 0.120
F(15, 2703) 29.08***
Number of observations 2,719
Notes: 1reference category: high-tech-industry.
***, ** depict significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
Source: ZEW spinoff-survey 2001, own calculations.
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Obviously, team foundations are more successful than single foundations in terms
of employment growth. The coefficient of Team in industry j is significant and
has positive values across the industries. A firm which is founded by a team
in the high-tech industry experiences an employment growth that is about 4.8
percent higher than a firm that is founded by one person alone in the same
sector.8 Equivalently, team foundations in technology-oriented services have an
employment growth that is roughly 4.7 percent above the employment growth
by single foundations in this industry. And team foundations in the knowledge-
intensive services experience a roughly 4.8 percent higher employment growth
than their counterpart founded by a single person in the knowledge-intensive
services.
Concerning the control variables the results are virtually consistent with what one
would expect and what is previously found in the literature. It turns out that
there is a U-shaped relationship between firm size at market entry (measured in
terms of the number of employees including the founders at foundation time) and
employment growth. In addition, the speed of growth is higher when the firms
are in their first year of existence. These patterns coincide with the results of
e.g. Evans (1987) and Almus and Nerlinger (1999). Additionally, the number of
contacts to science, the conduction of R&D and public support have all positive
and highly significant effects on employment growth. Somewhat unexpected is
the negative sign of the coefficient of job experience. The reason for this could be
that with this variable not only the effect of job experience is captured but also
the effect of age. If older entrepreneurs do not tend to set up an expanding firm -
because they cannot reap the benefits for a sufficiently long time - then the sign
of the variable measuring job experience can be explained. However, this effect
cannot be controlled for since there is no information about age in the data set.
Generalists vs. Specialists. Hypothesis 2 contrasts generalists against spe-
cialists on the level of single entrepreneurs. The impact of having a generalist
rather than a specialist as a firm leader is shown in Table 3. The interesting
coefficients in this case are the ones relating to the variables in the first three
rows.
8The impact of the interesting variables on the average employment growth factor is calcu-
lated according to eβk .
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Table 3: Employment Growth and Generalists
Sample: single entrepreneurs
Dependent Variable: Subjects Disciplines
Employment Growth: ln(E2002,i)−ln(Et,i)2002−ti Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error)
Generalist in high-tech industry -0.105 (0.051)** -0.105 (0.051)**
Generalist in technology-oriented services 0.034 (0.039) 0.042 (0.057)
Generalist in knowledge-intensive services -0.022 (0.051) 0.004 (0.056)
ln(Et) -0.065 (0.030)** -0.066 (0.030)**
ln(A) 0.204 (0.038)*** 0.204 (0.038)***
ln(Et) ∗ ln(A) 0.006 (0.016) 0.007 (0.016)
(ln(Et))2 0.007 (0.006) 0.007 (0.006)
(ln(A))2 -0.087 (0.018)*** -0.087 (0.018)***
Job experience -0.002 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.001)***
Number of contacts to science 0.023 (0.004)*** 0.023 (0.004)***
Continuous R&D 0.042 (0.015)*** 0.042 (0.015)***
Occasional R&D -0.008 (0.017) -0.007 (0.017)
Public support 0.032 (0.016)** 0.032 (0.016)**
Technology oriented services1 -0.027 (0.021) -0.026 (0.021)
Knowledge intensive services1 0.001 (0.022) -0.000 (0.022)
Constant 0.022 (0.035) 0.021 (0.035)
R2 0.119 0.119
F(15, 905) 9.61*** 9.48***
Number of observations 921 921
Notes: 1reference category: high-tech-industry.
***, ** depict significance at the 1% and 5% level respectively.
Source: ZEW spinoff-survey 2001, own calculations.
20
It turns out that generalized single entrepreneurs are not more successful than
their specialized colleagues. The coefficients for Generalist in technology-oriented
services and Generalist in knowledge-intensive services are insignificant. Though
there appears to be an effect for generalists in the high-tech industry this result
is presumably not valid since the respective data cell contains only three observa-
tions. If one omits the distinction between the industries to increase the number
of observations in the cell the respective coefficient is also insignificant (see Ta-
ble 8 in the appendix.) This result persists if generalists in regard to disciplines
rather than single subjects are considered (i.e. defining an individual as gener-
alist if he studied e.g. biology and business administration but not if he studied
biology and chemistry). Thus, it seems that although generalists are more likely
to found a firm, as shown by Lazear and others, they are not supportive for the
subsequent growth of their firm. However, it cannot be obviated that the result
is driven by the data restrictions, since having studied more than one subject is
a rather rare event so that the effect of this group cannot be identified correctly.
Additionally, since the information about the subjects is not very detailed, indi-
viduals who studied subjects which are inherently generalistic, such as Business
Computer Science (Wirtschaftsinformatik), cannot be made up. For the analyses
they are defined as specialists though they are actually generalists.
Generalistic Teams vs. Specialized Teams. Regarding the third hypothesis
there is also no support for the conjecture that teams with a mixed composi-
tion concerning the subjects studied are more successful in terms of employment
growth (see Table 4). All coefficients of the three relevant variables (Generalistic
team in high-tech-industry, Generalistic team in technology-oriented services and
Generalistic team in knowledge-intensive services) are insignificant both on the
subject and discipline level.
This also holds for combinations between natural scientists and business admin-
istrators (see upper half of Table 5). Hunsdiek and Albach (1985) argue that it is
necessary for high-technology companies to be successful to have natural sciences
respectively technical skills and managerial skills or technical and managerial
skills represented among the founders. The reason mentioned by the authors is
that because of the rapid technology change and the necessity to be on the front
edge of the development a single entrepreneur cannot do both: developing new
21
Table 4: Employment Growth and Generalistic Teams
Sample: team foundations
Dependent Variable: Subjects Disciplines
Employment Growth: ln(E2002,i)−ln(Et,i)2002−ti Coeff. (Std. Error) Coeff. (Std. Error)
Generalistic team in high-tech industry -0.031 (0.024) -0.036 (0.024)
Generalistic team in technology-oriented services 0.019 (0.014) 0.019 (0.015)
Generalistic team in knowledge-intensive services -0.006 (0.015) -0.002 (0.015)
ln(Et) -0.149 (0.027)*** -0.149 (0.027)***
ln(A) 0.236 (0.032)*** 0.237 (0.032)***
ln(Et) ∗ ln(A) 0.023 (0.013)* 0.023 (0.013)*
(ln(Et))2 0.020 (0.005)*** 0.019 (0.005)***
(ln(A))2 -0.122 (0.013)*** -0.123 (0.013)***
Job experience -0.002 (0.001)*** -0.002 (0.001)***
Number of contacts to science 0.015 (0.003)*** 0.015 (0.003)***
Continuous R&D 0.053 (0.011)*** 0.053 (0.011)***
Occasional R&D 0.028 (0.013)** 0.028 (0.013)**
Public support 0.025 (0.010)** 0.025 (0.01)**
Technology-oriented services1 -0.048 (0.020)** -0.045 (0.018)**
Knowledge-intensive services1 -0.015 (0.021) -0.016 (0.019)
Constant 0.146 (0.042)*** 0.146 (0.041)***
R2 0.132 0.133
F(15, 1661) 20.89*** 20.98***
Number of observations 1,677 1,677
Notes: 1reference category: high-tech-industry.
***, **,* depict significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Source: ZEW spinoff-survey 2001, own calculations.
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products and managing the firm. However, at least for the success of academic
spin-offs in Germany which have natural scientists and business administrators
among their founders it does not seem to be relevant whether the founding team
comprises both of these skills. Teams with natural scientists and business admin-
istrators in the three sectors are not more successful than firms whose founding
teams do not show this combination. The picture becomes somewhat different
if one considers the combination of engineers and business administrators. In
the technology-oriented services this combination seems to be beneficial. A team
foundation that has engineers and business administrators among their founders
grows by 4.9 percent more than a team in this sector that does not exhibit this
combination. In the two other sectors no effect appears. If one restricts the co-
efficient to be the same across industries then a team with engineers and natural
scientist experience an employment growth that is 4.3 percent higher than a team
with other combinations of the studied subjects (see Table 8 in the appendix).
Homogeneous vs. Heterogeneous. The fourth hypothesis contrasts homoge-
neous teams in regard to the quality to heterogenous teams. The results of the
regression are shown in Table 6. It turns out that the coefficient for homogeneous
teams in regard to the quality (measured in terms of the research establishment
its members come from) are insignificant across all industries and model speci-
fications. Thus, the human capital composition of teams does not seem to play
any role for the success of the newly founded firms.
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Table 5: Employment Growth and Generalistic Teams
Sample: team foundations
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth: ln(E2002,i)−ln(Et,i)2002−ti Coeff. (Std. Error) R
2 F(15, 1661)
Team with natural scientists and business administrators 0.130 20.70***
in high-tech industry 0.005 (0.038)
in technology oriented services 0.015 (0.028)
in knowledge-intensive services 0.010 (0.026)
Technology oriented servicesa -0.026 (0.014)*
Knowledge intensive servicesa -0.003 (0.015)
Constant 0.129 (0.039)***
Team with engineers and business administrators 0.133 20.58***
in high-tech industry 0.064 (0.049)
in technology oriented services 0.048 (0.024)**
in knowledge-intensive services 0.025 (0.028)
Technology-oriented services1 -0.023 (0.014)
Knowledge-intensive services1 0.000 (0.015)
Constant 0.097 (0.037)***
Notes: 1 reference category: high-tech-industry. Additional control variables included.
***,**,* depict significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level respectively; number of observations: 1,677.
Source: ZEW spinoff-survey 2001, own calculations.
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Table 6: Employment Growth and Homogeneous Teams
Sample: team foundations
Dependent Variable:
Employment Growth: ln(E2002,i)−ln(Et,i)2002−ti Coeff. (Std. Error)
Homogeneous team in high-tech industry 0.020 (0.028)
Homogeneous team in technology-oriented services 0.003 (0.016)
Homogeneous team in knowledge-intensive services 0.015 (0.015)
ln(Et) -0.152 (0.029)***
ln(A) 0.238 (0.034)***
ln(Et) ∗ ln(A) 0.022 (0.014)
(ln(Et))2 0.021 (0.005)***
(ln(A))2 -0.121 (0.013)***
Job experience -0.002 (0.001)***
Number of contacts to science 0.016 (0.003)***
Continuous R&D 0.052 (0.012)***
Occasional R&D 0.026 (0.014)*
Public support 0.026 (0.011)**
Technology-oriented services1 -0.019 (0.028)
Knowledge-intensive services1 0.015 (0.028)
Constant 0.114 (0.043)***
R2 0.141
F(15, 1546) 20.03***
Number of observations 1,562
Notes: 1reference category: high-tech-industry.
***, **,* depict significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level respectively.
Source: ZEW spinoff-survey 2001, own calculations.
25
4 Conclusion
The starting question of this paper has been how the composition of human
capital is related to the success of academic spin-off. The ulterior motive has
been to figure out indications for the adjustment of academic curricula towards
the job qualification of students for a job. To this end the models of Lazear
(2005) and Fabel (2004) have been interpreted with regard to this question and
tested subsequently by using a firm level data set including information on the
educational background of the founders. In summary, the results are:
 Team foundations are more successful (i.e. exhibit higher employment
growth) in founding firms than single entrepreneurs.
 Single entrepreneurs who have studied several subjects are equally success-
ful than single entrepreneurs who have studied only one subject. However,
this result may be driven by the fact that studying more than one subject
is a rather rare event and inherently generalistic study courses cannot be
specified in the data.
 Teams in technology-oriented services which have engineers and business
administrators among their founders, experience higher employment growth
than teams who do not have this combination in this sector. Otherwise it
seems to be irrelevant whether a team consists of members who have studied
different subjects.
 It does not seem to be beneficial to combine people from different types of
research establishments.
The results slightly indicate that the approach of Fabel is more relevant for grad-
uates founding an own firm out of academia, since the results show teams that are
more successful. However, for the design of academic curricula the outcome is not
very helpful since the constitution of teams is clearly not necessarily a topic of the
design of curricula on the content level. Here, the relevant point is that individ-
uals are matched. Naturally, this can happen in different ways. Individuals with
26
the will to found a firm can meet in special courses on entrepreneurship. How-
ever, a university-wide social gathering or even a gathering outside the university
would also suit for this purpose.
A question that comes up from this analysis for further research is why there
are single entrepreneurs at all, if teams come out to be more successful. Some
authors suggest that it depends on the industry whether a firm is founded by a
team or not (e.g. Gartner, 1985). However, running a probit of the dependent
dummy variable “Team” on the industry dummies as a first try it turns out that
the different industries do not have any effect on the probability of founding as
a team. Thus, the question remains and does not seem to be addressed in the
literature yet.
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